Abstract: Diffusion scholarship expects little adaptation of core elements of policy models. However, the empirical reality is different; diffusion of even highly-regarded models, such as the Silicon Valley venture capital (VC) policy model, results in marked adaptation of the source model. This article asks: why does variance, rather than convergence, characterize the diffusion of the Silicon Valley VC model? The answer to this question lies in conceptualizing policymakers as rational in light of their normative context rather than as wholly rational or bounded learners. I demonstrate why and how the Silicon Valley VC model is necessarily adapted by "contextually rational" policymakers in the geographically, ethnically and economically proximate states of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. I find that policymakers' interventionist orientations, private sector financing preferences and international versus domestic firm promotion biases drive contextually rational -and unique -adaptations of the Silicon Valley VC policy model. Policymakers' norms are central to shaping how the model is translated into local policy action, meaning we can, and should, expect adaptation as a result of diffusion.
outcome of diffusion processes in a number of empirical areas (see Volden et al, 2008; Meseguer, 2009) . The rational expectations inherent in the learning literature lead to an overarching hypothesis that when actors study the same (perfect) information we necessarily expect them to make the same decisions (given the assumption that actors have the same, predictable preferences). As an illustration, in her rational learning investigations, Meseguer posits that if policymakers obtain information about a highly successful model from outside their region, "they will make the same policy choices" (Meseguer, 2009: 216) . In bounded rationality literature, though actors are no longer assumed to be identical in their preferences, there is still an expectation towards more, rather than less, convergence. Bounded rationality's proclivity towards explaining convergence stems from its focus on explaining which models are studied via the availability and representativeness cognitive heuristics (Poulsen, 2014; Weyland, 2006) . Fundamental to my argument, even the cognitive bias best positioned to explain localization -"anchoring" -expects a high degree of replication since policymakers hold the core elements of the studied model as an "anchor" from which they do not deviate (McDermott, 2008) .
As a result of both rational and bounded learning theory's expectations of convergence, there is insufficient analytical muscle in diffusion's learning scholarship to account for the empirical reality of diversity as a pervasive outcome of diffusion processes.
This article addresses this deficiency by theorizing how learning processes necessarily drive adaptations of -rather than conformity to -diffusion templates. My contention is that the entire learning process is shaped by policymakers' "contextual rationality" -meaning that the initial selection of information to study, the subsequent template search process and processes of adaptation to the local context -can be understood by investigating local normative biases.
Given my presumption that local norms are central to how policies diffuse, even core elements of policy templates are expected to be transformed differently as they diffuse. In light of my focus on policymakers' norms in the diffusion process, similar to Acharya (2004 Acharya ( , 2009 ), Lenschow et al (2005) and Yeo and Painter (2011) , this paper delves into the "black box" of the local context in the diffusion process. This paper proceeds as follows. To start, I introduce the case study: the diffusion of the Silicon Valley venture capital i (VC) policy model to East Asia. Next, I review the bounded learning tools, particularly the literature's limited ability to systematically account for adapted versions of policy anchors. I then hypothesize how "contextual rationality" enables us to better account for the adaptation of policy models in the learning process. In doing so, I identify the norms that are expected to shape policymakers' learning in the Silicon
Valley VC policy area, leading to the policy model's unique localizations. The following two sections present the roles of norms in transforming the Silicon Valley VC policy model into the local VC policies deployed in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. In the concluding
section I discuss what the findings mean to the strength of the contextual rationality argument, and the impact of these results on IPE scholars' expectations for, and understanding of, the pervasiveness of adaptation in international diffusion processes.
Case Study: Diffusion of the Silicon Valley VC Policy Model
An illustrative case of the empirically pervasive phenomenon of "less convergence"
emanates from Silicon Valley ii : policymakers from at least 41 states studied the Silicon Valley VC policy model but then went on to deploy markedly different, interventionist VC policies at home. Internationally adopted "Silicon" monikers demonstrate the global reach of aspirations to build local Silicon Valleys. A few examples include the "Silicon Roundabout"
in London, Taiwan's "Silicon Island," Australia's "Silicon Beach," and the "Silicon Alley" in New York City. A myriad of "supply side and demand side" policies have been deployed by numerous polities in an attempt to promote Silicon Valley-like high-technology entrepreneurial and investment activity (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008) . In fact, there is an effective "menu" of eight categories of public policies deployed to build a local Silicon
Valley, including funding, taxation, regulation, promoting clusters, investing in technology infrastructure, attracting talent and investment, furthering stock market access and offering relevant education and training (Klingler-Vidra, 2014b: 38-41) .
The VC component of the Silicon Valley cluster has been of particular interest for policymakers. Policymakers' interest in VC comes as venture capitalists -along with angel investors -fill the "equity gap" that early-stage high-technology start-ups face when building their business (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . Rather than a bank giving entrepreneurs a loan, VC managers are hailed for being "smart money" because of their technology savvy, product development expertise and rolodex of potential customers and acquirers (NVCA, 2011) . For these reasons, in polemic, academic and policymaker press, VC has been purported to drive innovation, employment and economic growth (Lerner, 2009) . For example, the Wall Street
Journal recently dubbed VC "Humanity's Last Great Hope" given venture capitalists interest in, and ability to, invest in blue sky research, which research and development (R&D) coffers are increasingly shying away from (Mims, 2014) .
iii It is with these motivations in mind that policymakers study how they can "develop their own venture capital industries" similar to Silicon Valley as a means to support local innovation, competitiveness and high-technology entrepreneurial activity (Gulinello, 2005: 846) .
The VC policy template that they study includes three components -none of which were aimed specifically at Silicon Valley, but were American tax and regulatory changes that have become synonymous with promoting Silicon Valley's VC success: the limited partnership (LP) structure, attractive tax rates (the capital gains tax rate) and the allowance of private, institutional investors to invest in the VC asset class (via the Department of Labor's 1979 reinterpretation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")
Prudent Man Rule) (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a: 44-46; Lerner, 2009 ). America's LP structure reduces the potential liability of the VC funds' managers and investors by ensuring that their personal assets are not liable should the fund management company (and its portfolio companies) encounter financial difficulty. Importantly for the financial viability of the sector, LP structures correspond to capital gains tax treatment, which means that VC funds' profits are subject to a lower tax rate than the corporate tax rate (Lazonick, 2009 ). The ERISA reinterpretation helped catapult Silicon Valley VC investment activity as it allowed major
American institutional investors to invest in VC (Lerner, 2009: 39; Gompers and Lerner, 1999 ).
Together, these three elements -a robust legal structure, attractive tax rate and regulatory clarification -constitute a successful neoliberal VC policy template; neoliberal because the American tax and regulatory policies enabled but did not direct market activity.
The Silicon Valley VC cluster emerged because of local demand for VC (from the local concentration of high-technology firms), not because of purposive action to drive Silicon Valley VC investment activity specifically. iv In bounded rationality terms, the regulatory reinterpretation, legal structure and low tax rate constitute an "anchor" for how to create a Silicon Valley-like VC cohort.
As mentioned on page four, 41 countries have deployed Silicon Valley-inspired VC policies. Adopters range in terms of geography, culture, regime type and size, including Russia and Canada, France and the UK, China and Chile (see Klingler-Vidra, 2014a) . Figure   1 illustrates the diffusion trend. (Cumulative Number 1979 Source: Klingler-Vidra, 2014a On the surface, VC policy diffusion seems to be a story of "universal convergence" (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003: 325) . But, when looking beneath the veneer of the broad VC policy diffusion trend, I find that VC policies do not converge on replicating Silicon Valley's neoliberal policy environment (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a: 39-42 Simmons et al, 2008; Solingen and Borzel, 2014; Drezner, 2005) or diffusion to, and within, the Americas and Europe (e.g. Meseguer, 2008; Weyland, 2005 Weyland, , 2010 Weyland, , 2012 Swank, 2008; Radaelli, 2005; Checkel, 1999) .
Figure 1: State Launches of VC Policy Efforts
In this way, the article contributes to the modest number of studies on the diffusion of Western models to the East Asian region (e.g. Yeo and Painter, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2014c ).
In addition, these three Asian cases offer me the ability to examine diffusion into states of comparable sizes (population and economy wise) and development trajectories. Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Singapore each have largely ethnically Chinese populations of less than twentyfive million people (between six and twenty-three million) and economies with gross domestic product ranging from USD 250B to USD 475B.
Important to this article's theoretical contribution, the East Asian cluster warrants investigation because comparative capitalist literature, until recently, has spoken of a 'singular Asian model' (Amable, 2003) that governs the market, explored only a few East
Asian state (Storz and Schafer, 2011) or developed descriptive models (Whitely, 1992; Walter and Zhang, 2012; Witt and Redding, 2013) . I can contribute to East Asian comparative capitalism by identifying the unique, rather than uniform, norms that guide industrial policymaking within East Asia. Finally, and importantly to the robustness of the generalizability of the case study results, prior to choosing the East Asian cluster I mapped the VC policies deployed across numerous regions (including South America and Europe) and found variation within each cluster (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a ). This helped me verify that East Asia's regional variance is consistent with the variety -and interventionist nature -of policies deployed within other regions.
This study's data stems from semi-structured interviews with VC policymakers, VC industry professionals and small-and-medium-sized enterprise (SME)-focused international organization staff. I interviewed the senior VC policymakers in each case (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) and then utilized the snowballing technique to identify the next interviewees. Interviews focused on how the Silicon Valley VC policy model was studied, the focus of additional template searching, through to how and why local VC policies took their particular shape. These interviews, along with reviews of government reports and communiqués, form the basis for my findings about the role of norms in driving VC policymaking in the East Asian cases.
Bounded Rationality's Anchor
Drawing upon cognitive psychology tools, Weyland (2005 Weyland ( , 2006 blazed the trail for cognitive bias conceptualization in IPE research, by articulating how shortcuts (availability, representativeness and anchoring) steer policymakers' (boundedly rational) learning process. Weyland (2006: 50-51) suggests that the three cognitive biases of availability, representativeness and anchoring propel the "spread of similarity and diversity" (Weyland, 2006: 8) . But, as argued here, his conceptualization of the cognitive biases has not actually left scope for the causal paths by which cognitive heuristics lead to real diversity.
The first two cognitive heuristics -availability and representativeness -explain why certain policies are studied as well as how much value is assigned to the policies as templates.
The availability bias refers to "people's reliance on vivid, concrete, salient examples, which remain disproportionately cognitively 'available' in making choices about appropriate examples for emulation" (McDermott, 2008: 2) . Said another way, availability is the tendency to study the policy experiences of leaders (e.g. U.S. or E.U.) or peers (geographically or culturally proximate). In this vein, policymakers are motivated to learn about successful external policies that are proximate to their existing belief system, political development histories or institutional patterns Swank, 2008: 78) . The availability heuristic skews policymakers' attention towards studying the policies of states they believe are their peers or leaders. Representativeness, the second cognitive bias, refers to a tendency to assume that one country's (positive) policy experience is likely to be representative of the experience elsewhere (Weyland, 2006: 50; McDermott, 2008: 2) .
Policymakers' beliefs shape the perceived value of potential policy choices (Knill, 2005) , which impacts the valuation stage of the policymaking process (Weyland, 2006: 50) . More specifically, representativeness biases lead policymakers to subjective conclusions about the expected performance of the policy they are studying.
Weyland's third heuristic, anchoring, is the cognitive bias that should best account for the localization -or lack of localization -of studied models. Anchoring describes people's tendency to "focus on the 'anchor' of the original model" (McDermott, 2008: 2) . The anchoring heuristic portends that policymakers are "reluctant to diverge radically" from the original model (Weyland, 2006: 51) . This is why, according to bounded rationality scholarship, we see patterns of policy adoption -as policymakers deviate only slightly from the anchor as they at least implement the "core" of the studied model. point. Since biases are expected to lead policymakers studying the same information to arrive "at very different conclusions" (Meseguer, 2009: 19) , in this article I delineate and investigate which biases shape the localization -and even rejection -of core elements of the Silicon Valley VC policy anchor.
The Transformative Role of Contextual Rationality
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, cognitive heuristics' primary analytical muscle stems from their ability to explain why policymakers study certain policy models, but are less geared towards explaining modification of the selected models. Importantly, though Weyland acknowledges that boundedly rational learning does not produce "mimicking" of the model, he does not provide theoretical grounding for why and how much "anchors" are adapted locally. While Weyland's work lacks sufficient tools for investigating this phenomenon, recent diffusion scholarship has conceptualized how chosen models are adapted locally.
Scholars have demonstrated that domestic contexts are not "black boxes" into which models diffuse (Yeo and Painter, 2011) . Relationships between foreign information and local biases as well as domestic institutional environments are understood to affect the "rate and form" of diffusion (Hall, 1993; Lenschow, et al, 2005: 799 If we agree that agents adapt the models they study, Weyland's anchoring heuristic gives insufficient capacity and attention to how policymakers transform even core components of models. It is in this vein that I argue as policymakers study a model, policymakers' biases adapt (or even reject) core elements of the template to fit their local context. Rather than expecting replication of core elements as bounded rationality's "anchor" heuristic portends, and rather than assuming wholly rational learning, I argue that policymakers are "contextually rational" as they systematically adapt models to a degree and direction in line with their normative framework. The significance of this distinction is that it expects that learning processes lead policymakers in different jurisdictions to make unique, potentially significant, adjustments to policy templates. Said plainly, contextual rationality expects less convergence than what bounded rationality theory is able to account for.
Following this rationale, my framework hypothesizes how policymakers' norms determine the extent and direction of adaptation of models in the VC policy area. The norms that determine policymakers' biases, which are instrumental in the VC policy area, are: (1) interventionist orientation, (2) private sector financing norms and (3) international or local firm preferences. In the following paragraphs I detail how these three norms are expected to lead policymakers to come to informed, context-specific -and therefore unique -conclusions about how they deviate from the Silicon Valley VC policy anchor.
The first norm investigated in this study is policymakers' beliefs about the appropriate believers that market actors can better manage production and the allocation of resources than the state. As a vivid illustration of this staunch belief in laissez-faire, the last governor of Hong Kong quipped that "the words 'industrial policy' make me curl up inside" (Patten, 1998: 243) . Interventionist orientations such as these extreme examples of Japan and Hong
Kong have a "path dependent" nature that informs the background by which policymakers consider industrial policies (Walter and Zhang, 2012; Skocpol and Weir, 1985 -Vidra, 2014a -Vidra, : 2013 Hong Kong Trade and Industry Bureau, 1998: 2) . In this way, though Hong Kong VC policymakers deployed funding, they did so in a manner consistent with their belief that the private sector is better positioned than the government to make private investment decisions.
Taiwanese policymakers studied the Silicon Valley policy environment in the early 1980s, and then deployed completely different tools to constitute their local VC cluster. Tellingly, Taiwanese policymakers publicly stated that they were guided by a mantra that each country "has its own model and approach to development, which are intimately related to its cultural, historical, and socio-economical background" (GIO, 1983: 159) . With this as background, Taiwan's senior policymakers, most notably "father of Taiwan's economic miracle" K.T. Li, took a trip to Silicon Valley, Boston's Route 128 and Japan in 1981 to learn about VC (Klingler-Vidra, 2014; Kenney et al, 2002) .
Taiwanese policymakers' VC study trip exemplifies the template search behaviours of policymakers in their context-driven learning process. While Taiwanese policymakers believed that "Silicon Valley is a good example…in Taiwan, we don't have liquidity of human capital talent like in Silicon Valley, so we have to also learn from Japan, Korea or Germany" (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). Taiwan's VC policymakers then visited and investigated Japan's VC policy environment. In Japan, Taiwanese VC policymakers learned how to appease the risk-averse nature of local investors by using a corporate structure different from the LP structure (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). However, Taiwan's policymakers created their own "paper company" structure to be less restrictive than Japan's unlimited liability structure (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a) . In this way, though Taiwanese policymakers learned from Japan, they did not merely copy the Japanese Thus, Taiwan's paper company structure was designed to require that investors approve investment decisions, in contrast to the LP structure which endows the VC manager with that authority (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a). Taiwan's paper company was motivated by policymakers' bias towards accommodating local investors' preferences, as well as an acknowledgement of the differences between the Taiwanese and American legal context (Klingler-Vidra, 2014a:
149-151). Taiwan's tax credits were restricted to local, corporate VC investors as a similar expression of policymakers' preference for pleasing local investors (Wang, 1995: 2).
Taiwan's 1983 Regulations for the Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises gave first-time VC investors a 20% tax deduction for investments in local start-up companies for (TVCA, 2006) . Taiwanese policymakers' embrace of tax incentives stems from their preference for "limiting the use of selective credit," which was established during the Martial Law era as a means of reducing the private sector's power vis-à-vis the Kuomintang government (e.g. by keeping companies small, they could not create a rival power) (Wade, 1990: 296) . Their bias towards tax credits rather than direct private sector funding (e.g. loans, grants or equity investments) was firmly entrenched by the time Silicon Valley VC was studied in the early 1980s. As a result, Taiwanese VC policymakers did not "want to take risks so felt that it's best to be consistent" with strategies proven locally, rather than try to replicate the Silicon Valley environment (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Only one of the Silicon Valley core elements (the LP structure) was transmitted in two of the three cases. The other components of the Silicon Valley model -the ERISA reinterpretation and capital gains tax treatment -were not transmitted into local policy action. Instead, VC profits were taxed at corporate tax rates in Taiwan, and different tax credits and exemptions replaced low capital gains tax rates in all three cases. Regulatory changes that enabled significant local institutional investors to invest in the VC asset class -a "core element" of the model -were not enacted in any case. The table also highlights that policymakers in each locale created their own, differing means of supporting VC market development. Kong policymakers' once iron-clad neoliberal stance relaxed by the 1990s, which paved the way for its policymakers to pursue sector-specific tax exemptions and government VC funds.
The Impact of Norms in Adapting the
Private sector financing norms shaped how policymakers deployed funding as a means of prompting local VC activity. In Hong Kong, government funding for private sector firms was not in policymakers' lexicon until the 1990s, and even then, was not deployed in a way that policymakers chose winners.
x In line with their private sector financing norms, Hong Kong policymakers hired four private VC managers to invest government money on their behalf, rather than public officials deciding where to invest the money. In contrast, finance-centric Singaporean policymakers methodically sought out information on the Israeli Yozma fund. Rather than duplicating the size of the Israeli fund-of-VC-fund, Singaporean policymakers again comprehensively evaluated the Israeli fund in light of their contextspecific rationality, and as a result, adapted the fund to be larger (USD 1 billion instead of USD 100 million).
Policymakers' local versus international firm preferences primarily affected VC regulations, but also impacted the terms of tax, funding and non-financial incentives. As an illustration, Hong Kong's entrepot preferences motivated its policymakers to ensure an internationally consistent regulatory environment, particularly the availability of the Silicon Valley-consistent LP structure for its VC managers. In Taiwan, policymakers' focus on local investors' preference motivated them to study Japan's VC-relevant legal environment, which resulted in them offering a heterodox paper company structure. While the structure differs from Japan's, it is similar in how it endows local investors with more control over investment decisions than the Silicon Valley LP structure affords. Locally focused Taiwanese policymakers also restricted their tax credits for local use only. Singaporean policymakers' bias towards attracting international capital and international VC talent had a significant impact on each element of their VC policy. Policymakers' strong bias for soliciting international firms, rather than investing in local firms, propelled Singaporean policymakers to structure their Israel-inspired fund-of-VC-fund (the TIF) such that it allocated 75% of its funding to international VC managers who set up operations in Singapore. In addition,
Singapore created a non-financial incentive (the GIP) to attract international investors for their VC managers. The only element of the Silicon Valley model adopted intact in Singapore, the LP structure which was adopted in 2002, which was also a product of this bias towards soliciting international participation.
The below table summarizes what has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs about the primary impact of the policymakers' norms. The international or local firm preference had a very strong impact on the extent to which VC policies strive to attract foreign capital, specifically whether the Silicon Valleyconsistent LP structure was adopted and where government VC money is allocated. The findings of the three case studies proved to be binary in this regard, as in locally biased environments (Taiwan), the LP structure was not utilized, and in internationally biased contexts (Hong Kong and Singapore), the LP structure was deployed. The more insular
Taiwanese policymakers ensured local fit by designing a legal structure aligned with local investors' preferences ("paper company" control over investment decisions) and local investors' interests (tax credits for local investors). The decision about using funding to support the VC industry does not seem to have been affected by domestic or foreign firm preferences. However, international versus local firm preferences did impact the direction of VC funds. In the entrepot states of Hong Kong and Singapore, policymakers' preferences for international manifested into differently structured funds that both allocated to blue chip, foreign VC managers.
Based upon the confluence of these three norms in each case, despite each state's policymakers studying the Silicon Valley VC policy model, they each came to different conclusions about how best to grow their own Silicon Valley-like VC cluster. Contextspecific norms about the interventionist orientation of the state acted as the primary determinant of the broad policy choice set and the subsequent template search process. Then the private sector financing norm propelled the use of direct public funding, the outsourcing of government money to private management and conceding state revenue (via tax credits).
International or local firm preferences determined where any funding was directed towards, or limited to, and also propelled the use or rejection of the LP structure. Bias-driven learning led policymakers to study different policy templates following their studying of Silicon
Valley. This variance in subsequent search behavior contributed to each state's unique adaptation of the source Silicon Valley VC policy model.
Conclusion
My primary finding is that contextually rational policymakers, even when systematically studying the same highly successful model, come to unique conclusions about how to reach the same outcome. In this case, East Asian policymakers came to believe that different paths would lead each of them to build their local Silicon Valley-like VC cluster. I have conceptualized how and why policymakers' biases frame how, and how much, successful "anchors" such as the Silicon Valley VC model are adapted. My contextual rationality conceptualization helps explain an empirically pervasive phenomenon that diffusion research struggles to grasp: the spread of similar but different policies.
My primary point of departure has been with the bounded rationality literature's presumption that internationally diffused policy models are expected to maintain at least the core elements of the studied policy due to adopters' reluctance to deviate from the anchor. I have argued how and why core elements may be rejected and additional elements added to local policy concoctions in the name of producing a local version of the model. By understanding policymakers as "contextually rational" rather than boundedly rational, we as IPE scholars are not anchored to expect policymakers to replicate the core of a model.
Instead, we have theoretical tools for examining how contextually rational policymakers process information -all the while considering how they can learn more in order to translate the model into local policy. Contextual rationality therefore shapes what policymakers study (including additional policy templates) and how they translate it into local policy. In the VC policy area, the norms that most informed policymakers' translation of the Silicon Valley model were their interventionist orientations, preferred means of funding private sector activity and biases for supporting international or local firms. In other empirical areas, it may be these norms that determine local policy adaptations, but it may be other norms altogether.
Policymakers' context-specifically rationality underpins why even in what should be a case of convergence -the spread of the highly successful and much studied Silicon Valley VC model -we have not seen universal convergence, or even convergence amongst peers.
Since policymakers' norms shape how the model is translated into local policy action, the takeaway is that we can, and should, expect varying adaptations within clusters, and across broad adopting populations, as a result of diffusion.
